Relevancy between corporations and clans: ideologies behind corporate law by Long, Q
Title Relevancy between corporations and clans: ideologies behindcorporate law
Author(s) Long, Q
Citation Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal, 2009, v. 10 n. 2, p. 354-383
Issued Date 2009
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/58908
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
 1 
Relevancy between Corporations and Clans:  
Ideologies behind Comparative Law 
Qinglan Long1 
 
 
 
“No people can live without faith in the ultimate victory of something. So while 
theology slept, the laity betook itself to other sources of Last Thing”-- to the 
eschatology of Karl Marx, on the one hand, and of Friedrich Nietzsche, on the 
other—Rosenstock-Huessy. 
 
For a man to give full realization to his heart is for him to understand his own 
nature, and a man who knows his own nature will know Heaven.  By retaining his 
heart and nurturing his nature he is serving Heaven.  Whether he is going to die 
young or to live to a ripe old age makes no difference to his steadfastness of purpose.  
It is through awaiting whatever is to befall him with a perfected character that he 
stands firm on his proper destiny.—Mencius    
 
I. Introduction.  
      The main theme of this article is the relationship between ideology and institutions in 
comparative study of Western corporation and Chinese clan.  It is only when persons 
become more sharply aware of themselves as individual that they need to reflect 
consciously on the community into which they form themselves.  Understanding the 
history of Western and Chinese ideologies will not explain the whole story of the western 
corporation or Chinese clan; “but we shall never begin telling the story of either if we                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
ignore such study.”2   
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      In his article: Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship,3 Professor Teemu Ruskola 
argued that the traditional Chinese clan was “corporation” in an economic sense; the clan 
was viewed as a profit-seeking corporation in the idiom of the family.  “In terms of both 
their institutional organization and their activities, many ancestral trusts are usefully 
viewed as business corporations, rather than merely ritual properties of ‘natural’ extended 
families.”4   He suggested that the “bottom line” of the ancestral trusts was the pursuit of 
material profit rather than the satisfaction of the needs of ancestral spirits.  Clans were 
independent legal personalities because family collectives could sue and be sued as well 
as own and dispose of property in a corporate capacity.  Their management was 
centralized: senior members constituted a council, analogous to a “board of directors,” 
and left the actual clan management to various “corporate officers.” 5 
      Noting that monetary motivation and economic interests had been tangential and 
ambiguous areas of Confucian rhetoric and its interpretation, Ruskola sharply exposed 
the economic interests and monetary incentives within the traditional clans and Chinese 
Feudalism.  Nevertheless, even if there were economic aspects in clan organizations 
which met most of the criteria of modern business corporations, can they be equated with 
clan corporations?  Max Weber said: “Economic conditions have, as we have seen, 
everywhere played an important role in the development of society, but they have 
                                                 
3 Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and Development Theory 
in a Chinese Perspective, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1599 (2000). 
4 Id. at 1634. 
5 Id. at 1635. 
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nowhere been decisive alone and by themselves ...”6    Calling an institution a 
“corporation” automatically imports a set of largely invisible Western conceptual 
assumptions, which include freedom of contract; separation of ownership and 
managements and other western political, social and ideological values I will discuss 
later.  These concepts are entirely foreign to the Chinese clan culture.7  It is hard to 
believe that corporation and Chinese clan could be said to function in the same or similar 
way except on a purely technical level.  Despite the promise to move away from the 
stereotype of studying Chinese law, the overall approach Ruskola applied falls squarely 
into the traditional comparative method--functionalism.   
      Instead of critiquing point by point Ruskola’s arguments, this article re-examines the 
historical and ideological background of Western corporation and Chinese clan.  It 
explains that Western corporation, besides its economic functions, has its constitutional 
origins from the competition and cooperation, among ecclesiastical and secular powers 
after Papal Revolution; Chinese clan has its rootedness in the spiritual orientation of self-
cultivation in Confucianism.  Through exposing the two institutions to their extremely 
dense and complex social and ideological background, the article demonstrates 
comparative law should involve something called “cultural immersion approach”.8  It 
requires comparatists to acknowledge that a legal system is not only an accumulation of 
                                                 
6 Proceeding of the First Conference of German Sociologist, 1910, quoted in Max Weber, Economy and 
Society, ed Guentler Roth and Clause Wittich (New York 1968), I, Ixiv 
7 The normative implications of the term “corporation” include: corporation is an instrument for economic 
growth and productive effort.  It provides the major device for collection of capital and the later-scale of 
technical developments and market expansions.  See general, ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, 
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, (2d ed. 1967). 
8 Vivan Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. Comparative law, 46 
Am. J. Comp. L. 43. 
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rules but a cultural phenomenon.  In order to understand different legal cultures, 
comparatists must immerse into rich culture context even though they can be sure that 
they will never be quite sure.  In painstakingly examining the political, economical, 
historical and psychological specificities of different culture, comparatists must focus on 
the ideologies behind physical makeups in different traditions, which molded the entire 
legal system.  Part II of the article discusses the methodological struggles in comparative 
study, including linguistic and culture problems.  It delineates how in its study of foreign 
legal cultures, comparative law runs the risk of superimposing its own values upon other 
legal cultures.  Subsequently, Part III introduces the origin of Western corporation.  It 
examines that the word “corporations” in its broad sense which  has a more extensive 
meaning than just business institution.  Further, in medieval and early modern history, the 
application of corporate principles to the state contributed to the development of 
constitutionalism and to the idea of popular sovereignty.9  Part IV turns to the Chinese 
clan.  It traces the clan tradition to Confusionism’s filial relation in the family and 
suggests that self-transformation through communal act is the ideology behind the 
tradition of Chinese clan.  Part V concludes that Chinese clan and Western corporation 
are different institutions evolving from different historical, cultural and ideological 
contexts.  This comparative study attempts to explain the difference, not explain it away.   
II. The Methodological Struggles 
      Given that each society embraces a corresponding type of economy, political system, 
law, religion and artistic style, it is the integrated portrait of the structural elements and 
                                                 
9 BRIAN TIERNEY, RELIGION, LAW AND THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 1150-1650 82-84,  
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their interactions that constitute the historical experience of a society. 10  In order to 
comprehend any meanings of institutional and societal change fully, these components 
have to be analyzed together.  The Western corporate growth was stimulated by the 
commercial revival of the Twelfth Century when freedom of contract and freedom of 
movement were prevalent and when market and fairs were common in cities and towns 
throughout Europe.11  By viewing the Chinese clan organization as a profit-seeking 
business corporation in the guides of family, it assumed that Chinese ancient economy 
had experienced the same pattern of Western commercial transformation.  One of the 
main features of functionalism is that it presupposes that law is asked to resolve the social 
problems of all countries and that these problems are similar; therefore, the solutions to 
these problems are the same. This assumption of similarity works reasonably well within 
the same cultural sphere.  If, however, comparisons take place in cross cultural scenario, 
it becomes increasingly irrelevant.  Like here, even as the commercial transactions 
emerged in cities and large numbers of traveling merchant participated in markets and 
fairs, the cities in China did not form the independent units.12  The professional 
merchants as a new class never prospered in traditional China.  Man depended on the soil 
for his living.13  Migration or moving from countryside to cities, which were 
indispensable to the growth of commerce, was alien to the Confucian concern of “the 
                                                 
10 HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 538-
558  (Harvard University Press 1983). 
11 Oliver Volckart & Antje Mangels, Are the Roots of Modern Lex Mercatoria Really medieval? S. Econ. J., 
427, 443 (1999) 
12 See MYRON L. COHEN, KINSHIP, CONTRACT, COMMUNITY, AND STATE: ANTHROPOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA § I-3 (Stanford University Press 2005). 
13 MICHEL C. MASSON, PHILOSOPHY AND TRADITION—THE INTERPRETATION OF CHINA’S PHILOSOPHIC 
PAST: FUNG YU-LAN 1939-1949 37 (RICCI Institute 1985). 
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Great Harmony as the Way embraces the nature.”14  Agriculture was paramount, but 
security and stability rather than economical growth were the supreme ideal of Chinese 
society.  Hence large-scale economic activities were hardly able to ferment in this 
infertile commercial soil.  
      More troubling, the functional method is concerned with how to compare the legal 
functions of different institutions.  By definition, functionlism is naturally interested in 
explaining things in terms of what happens afterward, not what came before.  This 
general lack of causal explanations results in neglecting the ideological and historical 
developments in different legal systems. By ignoring these cultural elements, 
functionalists unwittingly separate law from its surrounding culture roots and loss the 
legal sensibility towards foreign legal system.  Corporate law principles established 
Western concepts of limited government.  These theories were borrowed from cannon 
law that church was a corporation. And the corporation as a whole might limit papal 
authority.  The works of these canonists inspired the secular political theorist who created 
the concepts of popular sovereignty to impose limitations on the secular governments.15  
By merely examining their similar functions, functionalist consider Chinese clan as the 
counterpart of Western corporation.  If so, whether we can conclude that ancient Chinese 
clan institute also bore the idea of “limited government” with individual rights of self-
                                                 
14 Yu-Kung Kao and Kang-isun Change,  Chinese lyric criticism in the six Dynasties, American Council of 
Learned Societies Conference on Theories of the Arts in China (June 1979), included in Theoies of arts in 
China, eds. Susan Bush and Christian Murck (Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, 1984). 
15 In history, the application of corporate law principles to the state contributed to the development of 
constitutionalism and to the idea of limited government. See general Eric Enlow, The Corporate 
Conception of the State and the Origins of Limited Constitutional Government, 6 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol’y 1 
(2001). 
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determination. Evidently these notions have little relevance for the classical Chinese 
tradition. 
      When we try to understand the nature of certain institutes in the society, we need to 
analyze them in the larger cultural context.  Any institutional development can not take 
place in an intellectual void.  Society’s physical development is always interwoven with 
its ideological values. Failing to realize them, we would be able to comprehend neither 
their nature nor their functions. Clan organizations had their visible and functional side--
their assets, contracts, trading, but the rootedness of this institution may lie in its 
Confucian belief: the fiduciary community is an irreducible reality in ultimate self-
transformation; appreciation of self can only be obtained through genuine communication 
with others.16   There always exist the religious and ideological elements behind the 
institution structures.17   In Octavio Paz’s words, “[I]t is a society’s visible side--
institutions, monuments, works, things, -- but it is especially its submerged, invisible 
side: belief, desires, fear, repressions, dream”18   
      For Western tradition, it is impossible to understand its growth unless we consider 
constantly its ecclesiology and sacred values.  Christ as the representative of man had 
offered himself as a propitiation for man’s sin.19  Thus God has forgiven mankind its 
                                                 
16 See Generally TU WEI-MING, CONFUCIAN THOUGHT: SELFHOOD AS CREATIVE TRANSFORMATION ( State 
University of New York Press, 1985). 
17 BRIAN TIERNEY, RELIGION, LAW AND THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 1150-1650, IX 
X(Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
18 Quoted by HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL 
TRADITION 558, , (Harvard University Press 1983). 
19 “By His death on the Cross He satisfied the justice of God, freed us from sin, broke the power of Satan 
and restored us to grace.  Heaven from that time on was opened for all.  But to enter we must participate in 
the redemption . . .” ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, 3426, 3436, (Fathers of the English 
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state of sinfulness: the human race is absolved from the consequences of its inherited 
tendency toward greed, pride, power . . .  God’s honor was restored and he could be 
reconciled to man.20  It is said “without the fear of purgatory and the hope of the Last 
Judgment, the western legal tradition could not have come into being.21  But being 
religious to a Confucian means being engaged in the process of learning to be fully 
human.  Each human being has sufficient insight to become the exemplar of humanity 
and thus assume a godlike statue in the pantheon of the virtuous.  The “Profound person” 
in Confucianism is engaged in a continual process of self-transformation through the 
communal act as a “faithful dialogical response to the transcendent.”22  And “a society is 
no more an independent entity than is ceremony independent of the participants, the holy 
vessels, the altar, the incantations.” 23  
      Legal anthropologists have long struggled with the problem of choosing a proper 
vocabulary to describe Chinese laws.  The interaction of different social elements, 
especially the ideological character in law, creates formidable difficulties in making 
cross-culture comparative law study.  “In any language, individual words bear not only 
their primary meanings but also layers of nuance, slowly build up as a result of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Dominical Province trans., New York: Benziger Bros., 1947-1948); See also GEORGE H. WILLIAMS, 
ANSELM (St. Louis 1960). 
20 JAROSLAV JAN PELIKAN, CHRISTIAN TRADITION: A HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE, 183-198 
(University Chicago Press 1971-1989); see also HAROLD. J BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 181-185.  
21 HAROLD. J BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 558 (1983). 
22 See Generally, TU WEI-MING, CENTRALITY AND COMMONALITY, 94-98 (State University of New York, 
1989) (claiming that “ultimate self-transformation” implies that the process of leaning to be human never 
end. “Ultimate” refers to the greatest possible realization of that humanity.) 
23 HERBERT FINGARETTE, CONFUCIUS: THE SECULAR AS SACRED 77 (Waveland Press, Inc. 1972). 
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historical context in which the word has been used in the culture.”24  In order to transport 
a single word without distortion, one would have to transport the entire language around 
it.25  These difficulties are compounded by the linguistic symbolism of the Chinese 
language.  Chinese linguistic symbols are directly observed forms or characters which 
denote the immediate experience with items.  For example, the symbol for man in 
Chinese is 人, and the early symbol of house is 介.  The idiographic symbolism of the 
Chinese language concentrated upon the all-embracing, immediately apprehended 
aesthetic continuum.26  As a consequence, there was no alphabet.  In contrast, western 
linguistic symbolism put together the number of symbols constituting the alphabet in 
different permutation.27  Hence, Chinese language “automatically eliminates the logical 
whole-part relation between one symbol and another that occurs in the linguistic 
symbolism of the West”.28  It is obvious, syntactically and semantically, that the 
translation of meaning of Chinese into an equivalent English, presents the slippage 
problem; but other rhetorical, sentimental, parataxis/syntactic and contextual 
complications make it even more formidable.29   
                                                 
24 Janet E. Ainsworth, Categories and Culture: On the “Rectification of Names” in Comparative Law, 82 
Cornell L. Rev. 19, 26 (1996). 
25 The reason for such a translate technical is that the right English word is not one that merely expresses 
the Chinese concept in a particular text but one that can be used for the entire history of Chinese thought.  
See general, WING-TSIT CHAN, NEO-CONFUCIAN TERMS EXPLAINED xi (Columbia University Press, 1986).   
26 F.S.C.NOTHROP, THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST 316 (The MacMillan Company, 1947). 
27 ACHILLES FANG, SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE DIFFICULTY OF TRANSLATION, IN STUDIES IN CHINESE 
THOUGHT  263, (Arthur F. Wright ED., 1953). 
28 NOTHROP, supra note 25. 
29 For an elaboration on linguistic problem in the philosophic sense, see generally WILLARD VAN ORMAN 
QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT (The M.I.T. Press, 1960). 
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      The difficulty in linguistic translation is only one aspect of the problem with legal 
comparative study.  The deeper disagreement concerns the uniqueness of each individual 
culture.  Paul Bohannan assumes that every culture has a unique legal order, with 
distinctive legal institutions, practices and ideologies that evolve in the context of its 
overall social order.30   All cultures are mixed –derived from imported structures, 
concepts and ideas but also emanating from different normative systems which are based 
on customs, religions and languages, habitat and natural resources, families, geography 
and climate, ideologies and other features.31  In Clifford Geertz’s words, “Law . . . is 
local knowledge; local not just as to place, time, class, and variety of issue, but as to 
accent-- vernacular characterizations of what happens connected to vernacular 
imaginings of what can.”32  Man is tempted to see and hear what he expects to see and 
hear.  In the legal comparative study, it would be insufficient to merely map Chinese 
legal practices and ideologies onto familiar Western conceptual territory.33  If we impose 
the Western legal terminology on Chinese legal practice, we risk misunderstanding 
Chinese legal sensibility.  There is no single that element provides a magic key to the 
complexity of comparative legal study. The ideological analysis of law is an instructive 
point in understanding distinctive legal cultures.34  The stories of Western corporation 
                                                 
30 Janet E. Ainsworth, Categories and Culture: On the “Rectification of Names” in Comparative Law, 82 
Cornell L. Rev. 19, 28 (1996). 
31 Nora V. Demleitner, Combating Legal Ethnocentrism, 31 Ariz. St. L. J. 737, 748 (1999).   
32 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FACT AND LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, IN LOCAL 
KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167, 215 (1983). 
33 Ainsworth, supra note 29, at 30.  
34 See generally Alan Hunt, The Ideology of Law: Advances and Problems in Recent Applications of the 
Concept of Ideology to the Analysis of Law, 19 Law & Soc’y Rev. 11 (1985). 
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and Chinese clan would be hardly intelligible unless we become acquaintance with the 
different ideologies behind them. 
III Corporations in Western Ideology        
     The western legal tradition grew, in part, out of the structure of social, economic and 
religious interrelationships.35   It is impossible to understand Western legal tradition 
without exploring its moral and religious dimension.  Harold Berman, in his book “Law 
and Revolution”, traces the formation of western integrated and independent legal 
tradition to Papal Revolution in eleven and twelve centuries.  
      It may be useful to attempt to dispel some of the misunderstandings at this moment.  
The conventional historical perspective assumes that Western history is divided into three 
periods: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern.  Ancient history is the history of Greece and 
Rome.  The decline of Rome produced a medieval age, which lasted roughly from the 
fifth to the fifteenth century.  Then modern time, starting with the Renaissance and 
Reformation, constituted the first great turning point in the history of the West.  It is well 
recognized that the Renaissance and Reformation were the time when rediscoveries, 
reexaminations and receptions of Roman Law and Greek Law occurred and they 
became the sources of the Western legal tradition.36  However, the best historical 
research of the last five decades has pushed the Dark Ages back from the period before 
                                                 
35 HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 556  
(Harvard University Press 1983).   
36 Indeed, each of the ancient ingredients of Western culture was transformed by being mixed with the 
others.  The Western Europe turning to the Greek and Roman and Hebrew texts for inspiration and 
transforming those texts in ways they wished to fit into their contemporary societies. "Israel," "Greece," 
and "Rome," became spiritual ancestors of the West not primarily by a process of survival but by a process 
of adoption. 
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1450-1500 to the period before 1050-1100.37  Professor Berman in his book traces the 
Western legal tradition to a violent separation of the ecclesiastical polity from secular 
authority and to the formation within the church, cannon law, of the first modern Western 
legal system.38 The diverse political, economic, and cultural movements constitute the 
revolutionary character of the Papal Revolution.  In Professor Berman view, the system 
of competition and cooperation among ecclesiastical and secular authorities which 
emerged from the Papal Revolution fostered to establish the modern Western legal 
system.  The dualism of ecclesiastical and secular legal systems led to a pluralism of 
secular legal systems within the ecclesiastical legal order and to the concurrent 
jurisdiction of ecclesiastical and secular courts.  Further, the systematization and 
rationalization of law were necessary in order to maintain the complex equilibrium of 
plural competing legal system.   
      In the early part of the Eleventh Century, belief in the Last Judgment acquired a new 
significance in the West through the development of Purgatory--an intermediate 
judgment upon individual souls at the moment of their death.39  Last Judgment 
presupposes that “One’s whole life on earth is something to be accounted for at the Last 
Judgment.  But the accounting does not necessarily proceed according to an elaborate 
system of rules and standards.  The idea of Purgatory, on the other hand, presupposes that 
                                                 
37 Professor Berman claimed that even the most conservative historians now distinguish sharply between 
the Low Middle Ages and the High Middle Ages. 
38 See Generally HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL 
TRADITION 556  (Harvard University Press 1983).   
39 See supra note 37, at 169. Harold Berman also emphasizes that liturgy of All Souls’ Day shared the same 
spiritual significance with Purgatory.  It was a day to celebrate the community of all souls who had lived or 
would live.  Christian souls on earth and in purgatory anticipated that day with their prayers for mercy. 
 13 
the accounting does proceed according to an elaborate system of rules and standard . . . .  
Individual sins are to be weighed, and penalties in Purgatory are to be allocated according 
to the gravity of each sin.”40  Therefore, sin had formerly been understood as a condition 
of alienation from God; it now came to be understood in legal terms as specific wrongful 
acts or thoughts for which various penalties must be paid in temporal suffering, of this 
life or the next.41  The understanding of as a separation from God came to play a 
secondary role and eventually the “legalization” of life after death resulted in significant 
reduction of the Last Judgment itself.42   
      In this sense, man began to take the center of the stage.  No longer was it assumed 
that “temporal life” must be a process of decay until the Last Judgment.  On the contrary, 
it was assumed now that progress and reformation can be made in this world for the 
salvation in the next.  This provided the base for the belief in the capacity of man to 
regenerate the world and the necessity for him to do so in order to fulfill his ultimate 
destiny.43  “The sacred was used as standard to measure the secular order.”44  
                                                 
40  ORVILLE PRESCOTT, LORDS OF ITALY: PORTRAITS FROM THE MIDDLE AGES (New York 1972) (arguing 
that the church was considered to have jurisdiction over Purgatory; the time to be spent in Purgatory can be 
reduced by clerical decision.); See also supra note 24, at 171. 
41 See LAW AND REVOLUTION, supra note 37, at 171.  
42 Id.  Berman interpreted the Last Judgment became a ministerial function.  The implication was that all 
who were in Purgatory would in fact be purged of their guilt; having paid the full penalties, they could 
enter the kingdom of heaven. 
43 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: the Formation of the Western Legal Tradition 28 (Harvard 
University Press 1983).   
44 Id. 
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      In 1075, Pope Gregory VII declared the political and legal supremacy of papacy over 
the entire church and the independence of clergy from secular control.45  The system of 
competition and cooperation among ecclesiastical and secular powers which emerged 
from the Papal Revolution led to pluralism in ecclesiastical and secular legal systems.46 
“The church declared its freedom from secular control, having exclusive jurisdiction in 
some matters, and its concurrent jurisdiction in other matters.  Laymen, though governed 
generally by secular law, were subject to ecclesiastical law . . . in matters of marriage and 
family relations, in heritance, spiritual crimes and a number of other matters as well.  
Conversely, the clergy, though governed generally by canon law, were subject to secular 
law with respect to certain types of property disputes, and the like.  Secular law itself was 
divided into various competing types, including royal law, feudal law, manorial law, 
urban law and mercantile law.”47  Law became a way to resolve the political and 
economic conflicts and legal pluralism became a source of freedom.  The systematization 
and rationalization of law were necessary in order to maintain the complex equilibrium of 
plural competing legal systems.48  Law “permits reconciliation of conflicting authorities 
                                                 
45 Id. at 87. 
46 See Grace Goodell, From Status to Contract: The Significance of Agrarian Relations of Production in the 
West, Japan, and in “ Asiatic” Persia, Eur. J.Sociology 21,1980, at 288-291. 
47 The same person could go to and also be subject to the ecclesiastical courts in one type of case, the king’s 
court in another, his lord’s court in a third, the manorial court in fourth, a merchants’ court in a fifth.  Legal 
pluralism became a source of freedom.  See also Berman, Supra note 37, at 10. 
48 The new sense of law was to control a widely dispersed population; to regulate relations between 
competing ecclesiastical and secular polities; to enable secular and church authorities to implement their 
respective missions in programmatic ways. See Berman, Supra note 24, 113-18. 
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on the basis of synthesizing principles: wherever possible, the contradictions were to be 
resolved without destruction of the elements they comprised.”49   
      The theory of legal pluralism and jurisdictional limitation upon authority became 
fundamental constitutional principles underlying the new system of cannon in the 
Eleventh and Twelfth centuries.50  Yet an analysis of such principles requires the 
consideration not of constitutional law but corporation law.  The canonists created the 
constitutional ideas through their reflections on the corporation law. 51  
        The term “corporation”(universitas) came from Roman law.  Under Roman law, a 
corporation was conceived as a group that possessed a personality distinct from that of its 
particular members.52  A debt owed by a corporation was not owed by the members as 
individuals.53  During the twelfth century, the canonists developed these ideas to describe 
the whole church as a “mystical body.”54   The church declared itself to be corporate legal 
entity – an universitas—independent of emperors and feudal lords.  In the wake of Papal 
Revolution, the canonists modified and adapted the Roman law of corporation and used 
                                                 
49 HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 118 
(Harvard University Press 1983).   
50 BRIAN TIERNEY: RELIGION, LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT, 19 (Cambridge University Press, 
1982). 
51 According to canonist, it was the church as a corporate legal entity that conferred power upon individual 
officers: pope, bishops, abbots; an it was the law of corporations that determined the limits of that power.  
52 W.W.BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 175, (Cambridge, The 
University Press 1932); See also PATRICK WILLIAM DUFF, PERSONALITY IN ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 
(Cambridge, The University Press 1938). 
53 See Walter Ullmann: The Delictal responsibility of Medieval Corporations, Law Quarterly Review, 64 
77 (1948). 
54 St. Paul had called the church the body or corpus of Christ.  It was accepted that all Christians 
everywhere formed a spiritual body and the church as a whole would always adhere to the true faith when it 
acted together, as a corporate entity. 
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their new doctrines to help define the institutions of the church state.55   Two of these 
theories were of great importance in the evolution of later constitutionalism: first, the 
principle that a corporation has legal capacity to act through representatives, and second, 
the principle that the rights and duties of the corporation are distinct from those of its 
officers.    
      The word "representation" was borrowed from Roman law.56   In Roman law, a group 
could appoint an agent to negotiate with a third party, but the result was to establish an 
obligation between the third and the agent, not directly between the third party and 
principle.57  But the canonists gave new significance to this doctrine.  In cannon law, 
when a corporate group established a representative with full power, the group was 
directly obliged by the representative’s acts.58  Thus, each corporation had to have a head, 
who was empowered to perform acts which bound corporation, and who also had rights 
distinct from those of corporation.59  This new idea of representation acquired a 
constitutional significance when it was used to define the powers of representatives 
elected to the assemblies.  In English history, before this new doctrine, each rural 
community sent a messenger to report on local affairs to a king or even to discuss the 
                                                 
55 See JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS, STUDIES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM GERSON TO GROTIUS 14-15 
(Cambridge, 1907). Figgis claim that at that era, Church was legally more state-like than the states of 
middle age.  The Church had already developed the idea of sovereignty while individual kingdoms were 
governed through his personal feudal attachments.  
56 Roman terms Plena postesta or plena auctoritas (full power, full authority) were used to express the 
doctrine of representation. 
57 BRIAN TIERNEY: RELIGION, LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT, 23 (Cambridge University Press, 
1982). 
58 See generally GAINES POST, STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL LEGAL THOUGHT (Princeton University Press, 1964). 
59 See Pierre Gillet, La Personalite Juridique En Droit Ecclesiastique Sqecialement  77 (Malines, 1927) 
cited by Berman, Law and revolution, 219. 
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affairs with a king.  The canonistic idea of representation empowered a representative to 
bind a community by his decisions, thereby bridged the gap between sending a messenger 
to report and sending a representative to bind a community.60  The term full power 
representation first appeared in an English writ of summons to Parliament in 1268 and it 
remained unchanged from 1294 to 1872.61 
      Another Roman doctrine-- “what touches all is to be approved by all” was adapted by 
the canonists to express a generalized doctrine of consent.62  The canonist applied the 
doctrine to corporate constructions and explained the nature of general councils: a matter 
that touched a whole corporation/community could be approved by a representative 
assembly acting on behalf of all.63  The philosophical position of this doctrine is that a 
group cannot have a personality or a will distinct from that of its members.64  The main 
feature of the doctrine of “government by consent” is that legitimacy and obligations are 
derivative from the consent of those who create a government/community on voluntary 
act…65  This philosophical basis raised a crucial legal question about the distribution of 
powers between the officers and the members of a corporation.  An analysis of the 
                                                 
60 TIERNEY , RELIGION, LAW AND GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT, at 24.  In England, as early as 
1068, spokesmen for each rural community gave information to the compliers of Domesday book. 
61 Id. 
62 Roman term Quad omnes tangis ab amnibus approbetur: what touches all is to be approved by all.   
63 In 1214 pope Innocent III actually convoked a general council and to it summoned not only bishops but 
chosen representative of cathedral chapters because, he wrote, matters that concerned them were to be 
discussed.  In the secular states, this maxim was accepted as constitutional law. Edward I fist incorporated 
quad omnes tangis into English election writ in 1295.  
64 Tierney calls it a “moderate realist¨ position.  He quotes the statement of the great jurist Bartolus: All 
philosophers and canonists believe that the whole does not differ really from its parts. 
65 P. Riley, How Coherent is the Social Contract Tradition, J.HIST. Ideas, 543 (1973). 
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powers of the head and members of corporation, led to the development in the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries of legal theory of limitations upon the power of ecclesiastical and 
secular rulers to act along, without the advice and consent of their members and 
subordinates.66  In this way, The Roman corporation law was raised to the level of a 
constitutional principle: “What concerns everyone ought to be considered and approved 
by everyone.”67 
       However, constitutionalism requires not only consent to rulership but, more 
importantly, limitations on the powers of rulers.  In Twelve and Thirteenth Centuries, the 
society was indeed saturated with consensual practices.  Innumerable corporation groups-
- guilds, colleges, towns, parishes-- chose their leaders by consent.  Kings summoned 
assemblies to consent to taxation. Popes were chosen by election.68  Papal authority, 
however, was limited based on the theory of corporate law.69  The conciliar movement 
used general councils to limit papal control over the Church.70  The concilarists argued 
that the corporate body of the Church was superior to its head officer because the 
corporate body is the source of the officer’s power.71  This popular sovereignty principle 
                                                 
66 Berman, at 221. 
67 GAINES POST, STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL LEGAL THOUGHT, chap. 4, (Princeton University Press 1964) 
(asserting that the Romanists and canonists of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries put this rule together and 
applied to transactions involving a corporation, where the transactions was for the common utility .  They 
concluded, the consent of all the members or a majority of them were required.) 
68 See general, TIERNEY, RELIGION, LAW AND GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT, at 36.  
69 Eric Enlow, The Corporate Conception of the State and the Origins of Limited Constitutional 
government, 6 Wash. U.J.L. & Pol’y 1 21 (2001).  
70 The Conciliar theory asserted the superiority, under certain circumstances, of church general councils 
over the papacy. 
71  THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT C. 350-C.1450 576 (J.H. Burns ed., 1988) 
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rested on the presupposition that people delegated the authority to the ruler but the 
powers delegated were not permanently alienated from them.  Then the ruler had to 
recognize the people’s right to revoke or limit that power.72  However, another problem 
rose: “How could the Pope (ruler) be set above the church as the governor and yet be 
subordinate to the people whom he ruled as head?”73  The solution can be found in a 
distinction between the people as a corporate whole, an universitas, and the people as a 
collection of individuals.74  The ruler had greater power than each individual so that each 
was subordinate to him, but he was not greater than the corporate whole from which his 
power was derived.75  The works of these canonists inspired the secular political theorists 
like Mariana, Hooker, John Locke… and the theory of limited government came to be 
formulated.  These theorists used the corporation model for the structures of the state.  In 
general, they adopted the concepts of corporate-constitutionalism and created the theory 
of popular sovereignty to impose limitations on secular government and postulated the 
legal authority in the people themselves, independent of the government.76 
        As we discussed above, the emergency of modern corporation could not have 
occurred without flourishing of commerce in Europe.  When Teemu Ruskola compared 
                                                 
72 Supra note 68, at 20. 
73 Id. 
74 P. Michaud-Quantin, Universitas. Expressions du movement communautaire dans le moyen-age latin 
(Paris, 1970). Quoted in TIERNEY BRIAN, RELIGION, LAW AND THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT, 
26.  
75 Eric Enlow, The Corporate Conception of the State and the Origins of Limited Constitutional 
government, 6 Wash. U.J.L. & Pol’y 1 21.  
76 The corporation ideas, borrowed from cannon law are the groudwork for the conversion of the English 
king’s personal right of dominion into a right delegated to an officer of the corporation of the realm. They 
also provide the foundation of the American theory of popular sovereignty.   
 20 
Chinese clan with Western corporation, he was doing so in the economic and commercial 
sense.  From the commercial point of view, incorporation was an instrument whereby the 
wealth of innumerable individuals has been concentrated for expanding economic 
activity.  It allowed a group to make binding rules for its self-government, to function in 
law as a single person with right to held property and to sue and be sued and to persist 
after the lifetimes of its founding members.  In the Eleventh , Twelfth and Thirteenth 
centuries, all over the Europe, separated individuals were coming together, swearing 
oaths to one another, covenanting together to form new corporations--guilds, universities; 
cities…77  The whole society was made up of a concatenation of various corporations: 
“political, civil, religion, social and economical, in which the system itself was a great 
corporation, comprehending all others”.78  In late Eleventh Century, a new type of 
business arrangement, the commenda, came into being in Italy and England, by which 
capital was mobilized for long-distance trade.79  This partnership constituted a legal 
person which could own property, enter into contracts, and sue and be sued.  The partners 
were empowered to act jointly in behalf of the partnership.  Together they constituted a 
corporation whose personality was both transcendent and immanent, that is, both distinct 
from and linked with the persons of its members, which specially manifested the 
corporation personality.80  However, the most important contribution of the Commenda 
                                                 
77 R.S. LOPEZ, THE BIRTH OF EUROPE 260-262, (London: Phoenix House, 1967). 
78 Id.  
79 The commenda was a partnership agreement for a round-trip voyage to the Middle Aast, Africa.  One 
partner supplied the capital but stayed at home; other partner did the traveling.  The traveling partner 
usually received one-fourth of the profits and the managing partner bore all risks and kept the rest of the 
profits. See general R.S. LOPEZ, THE COMMERCIAL REVOLUTION OF THE MEDDLE AGES (New York, 1976).  
80 WYNDHAM ANSTIS BEWES, THE ROMANCE OF THE LAW MERCHANT 77 (WM. W. GAUNT & SONS, 
Inc., 1988). 
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was that limited partnership.  The liability of partners was limited to the amount of their 
initial investment.  This innovation partly avoided the prohibition of usury and partly to 
protect the formant partner, who financed the caravan venture but who stayed at home 
and confided the expedition to the acre of the acting partner.81  The investors could also 
reduce their risks by dividing their money among several different commendae rather 
than putting it all in one venture.  This limited liability fostered massive collectivization 
of property for further investigations.82  It is safe to say, commenda took the character of 
the modern corporation. 
      Moreover, the invention of other legal devices in the Eleventh and Twelfth Century 
was also a crucial element for the growth of modern corporation.  Western commercial 
law around that era grew in an integrated system of principles, concepts, rules and 
procedures.83  Many distinctive commercial legal institutions created at that time were 
unique in the Western and had no counterparts in ancient China.  One example: the 
invention of bills of exchange and promissory notes in eleventh and twelfth century.  The 
buyer signed a document address to the seller, promising to pay him money either at a 
certain time or in the future.  Such credit device reflected a strong confidence and trust in 
the integrity of the commercial community to which creditors and debtors belonged.84  
Another example: the development of bankrupt law struck a balance of not being ruinous 
                                                 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Olvier Volckart & Antje Mangels, Are the Roots of he Modern Lex Mercatoria Really Medieval?, S. 
ECON J. 427 (1999). 
84 ROBERT S. LOPEZ, THE COMMERCIAL REVOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE AGES 72 (Cambridge University 
Press, 1976).  
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to debtors and protecting creditors.85  All these commercial concepts and instruments 
were results of the enormous expansion of economic activity in Western Europe around 
the period of 1050 to 1200 and they were complete alien to classic Chinese tradition.   
      Among the characteristic development of mercantile law in the Eleventh to Twelfth 
Centuries was the rise of a merchant class, a necessary precondition for the development 
of modern corporations.  New technologies of cultivation facilitated a rapid increase in 
agricultural productions and population in the eleventh century.86  Many free peasants 
and lesser nobility began to leave the countryside and enter the cities to take up 
manufacturing or commerce.  “There was a continuous creation of new opportunities. . . 
to climb from one class to another. . .  Craftsmen became an entrepreneurs; peddlers 
made fortunes in commerce and money-lending . . . Expansion was simulated by constant 
immigration from the country . . .”87  The city was a place of opportunity where one 
could move upward in the social-economic hierarchy.  The city also accommodated large 
scale markets and fairs.  Credit, banking and insurance developed in the city to facilitate 
commercial activity.88  Meanwhile, the crusades, started in 1096, constituted not only 
                                                 
85 Berman, at 352. 
86 LYNN WHITE, MEDIEVAL TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHANGE, 57-69, (Oxford, Clarnedon Press 1961). 
White pointed to the importance of the invention of the horse collar; the introduction of a spring planting 
and a triennial crop rotation, which made it possible substantially to increase the food supply.  See also 
MARIE DOMINIQUE CHENU, NATUR, MAN, AND SOCIETY IN THE TWELFTH CENTURY, 43, (Jerome Taylor 
and Lester K. Little ed. and trans., University of Chicago, 1968). Chenu wrote that” the production of 
energy made enormous strides with the spread of machines to harness waterpower and to produce circular 
motion: mill wheels; hydraulic wheels; windmills, first used in Europe in 1105 . . . New means of transport 
and travel gave men increased freedom; the use of the keel and rudder dates from 1180 and the compass 
allowed long voyages by sea . . . The mechanical clock began to rationalize time . . .” 
87 ROBERT S. LOPEZ, CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE, 297-298, (M.M Postan and H.J. 
Habakkuk ed., 1966-1989). 
88 The complete list of the invention of legal devices may be found in LEVIN GOLDSCHMIDT, 
UNIVERSALGESCHICHTE DES HANDELSRECHTS, 133, (Stuttgart 1891), Quoted in BERMAN, LAW AND 
REVOLUTION, 349,(1983).  
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military actions but also economic programs of Papal Revolution.89  It expanded long-
distance trade, both overseas and overland.  Great international fairs were held in cities 
and towns throughout Europe.  Concomitant with the growth of overseas and overland 
trades was the development of the business association such as commenda, with 
collective personality.  They constituted a self-governing body, a community, whose 
personality was both separated from its members—most like the form of the modern 
business corporation.90   In summary, according to R.W. Southern: “There was no single 
outstanding technical innovation behind this expansive movement, but a combination of 
many circumstances; growing accumulation of capital, rising population, the return of 
Mediterranean to Western control, the political decline of the Greek and Moslem 
empires, all helped to open up ever-enlarging prospects to the West.”91  
      Without further pursuit, we may state that corporation was a unique phenomenon in 
Western society.  It was a consequence of Western’s social, religious and economical 
change and also was a constituent part of such change, and in that sense, a cause of that 
change.  These revolutionary chain reactions, however, were absent in China’s ancient 
society, because China took a different path. 
 
IV Chinese Clan in Confucianism 
                                                 
89 From 1074 on, Pope Gregory VII promoted the idea of an army organized under the papacy that would 
free the Christians of the East from domination by the Turkish infidels.  Nevertheless, the crusades were 
not only foreign wars but bore important domestic political results.  They expanded trade and contributed to 
the development of great cities such as Venice, Genoa and Pisa.  See CARL ERDMANN, THE ORIGIN OF THE 
IDEA OF CRUSADE, 149-153, 210-211,285-287, 308-309, (Princeton University Press 1977). 
90 See generally BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, 352-354, (1983). 
91 R.W. SOUTHERN, WESTERN SOCIETY AND THE CHURCH IN THE MIDDLE AGES, 34-35, (Penguin Book, 
1970). 
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       F. W. Mote comments:  
The basic point which outsiders have found so hard to detect is that the Chinese.  
are apparently unique in having no creation myth; that is, they have regarded the 
world and man as uncreated, as constituting the central features of a 
spontaneously self-generating cosmos having no creator, God, ultimate cause, or 
will external to itself.92 
 
However, the ancient Chinese were intensely concerned about the creation of the world.  
Chou Tun-i (1017-1073) says, “…the interaction of two Ch’I (Yin and Yang) engenders 
and transforms the myriad things.  The myriad things produce and reproduce, resulting in 
an unending transformation.”93  Human beings are not the rulers of creation. If they 
intend to become guardians of the universe, they must earn this distinction through self-
cultivation.94  The profound person, “through a long and unceasing process of delving 
into his own ground of existence, discovers his true subjectivity not as an isolated 
selfhood but as a true source of creative transformation.”95  Thus, the Chinese conceive 
of the cosmos, like the self, as an open system.  “As there is no temporal beginning to 
specify, no closure is ever contemplated.  The cosmos is forever expanding; the great 
                                                 
92 FREDERICK F. MOTE, INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATION OF CHINA, 17-18, (New York: Alfred A. Knopt, 
1971). 
93 TENG SHU-P’IN, CHUNG-KWO WEN-HUA HSIN-LUN [NEW VIEWS ON CHINESE CULTURE], 253-304 (Taipei: 
Lien-ching 1983). 
94 According to Neo-Confucianism, “for at bottom Heaven, Earth and man form one body.  The point at 
which this unity manifests in its most refined and excellent form is the innate knowledge of human mind. 
See general, INQUIRY ON THE GREAT LEARNING by WANG YANG-MING, Translated by WING-TSIT CHAN in 
A SOURCE BOOK IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY 685 (Princeton University Press, 1969); See also  TU WEI-MING, 
CONFUCIAN THOUGH—SELFHOOD AS CREATIVE TRANSFORMATION, 44, (State University of New York 
Press 1985). 
95 The Great Learning states in its main text: “From the Son of Heave down to the common people, all 
must regard cultivation of the personal life as the root or foundation.  SEE WING-TSIT CHAN, trans. and 
comp., A SOURCE BOOK OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), TU WEI-
MING, CENTRALITY AND COMMONALITY, 140, (State University of New York Press 1989).  
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transformation is unceasing.”96  A human being is an active participant, a living witness 
of historical continuity; a recipient of the finest essences in the cosmos.97  Inherent in the 
structure of the human is an infinite potential for growth and inexhaustible supply of 
resources for development.98  “A person’s selfhood embodies the highest transcendence 
within its own reality; no external help is needed for the self to be fully realized.  The 
realization of the self, in the ultimate sense, is tantamount to the realization of the 
complete unity between humanity and heaven.”99  Mencius, in a suggestive passage, 
observes: 
For a man to give full realization to his heart is for him to understand his own 
nature, and a man who knows his own nature will know Heaven.  By retaining his 
heart and nurturing his nature he is serving Heaven.  Whether he is going to die 
young or to live to a ripe old age makes no difference to his steadfastness of 
purpose.  It is through awaiting whatever is to befall him with a perfected 
character that he stands firm on his proper destiny.100 
 
      Learning to become a good person—a human in the Confucian context means 
becoming refined, morally excellent and religiously profound, is the ultimate and  
                                                 
96 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, 39 (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press 1981) 
97 See A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (explaining that: the precondition for humans to participate in the 
internal resonance of the vital forces in nature is our own inner transformation.  Unless we can fist 
harmonize our own feelings and thoughts, we are not prepared for nature, let alone for an “interflow with 
the spirit of Heaven and Earth.” It is true that we are consanguineous with nature. But as humans, we must 
make ourselves worthy of such a relationship.); See also TU WEI-MING, CONFUCIAN THOUGH, 60, (1985). 
98 Wang Ying-Ming said that “Our nature is the substance of the mind and Heaven is the source of our 
nature. …Our clear intelligence is the master of heaven and earth and spiritual beings. IN QUIREY ON THE 
GREAT LEARNING. See also TU WEI-MING, CONFUCIAN THOUGH, 60, (1985). 
99 Id; See also Wing-tsit Chan, THE DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN, 107-108 (arguing the reality of human is such 
that an eagerness to learn in order to give full realization to one’s heart, to know one’s own nature and to 
appreciate the meaning of humanity is the surest way to apprehend Heaven.  Since our nature is conferred 
by Heaven, it is our human responsibility to participate in the cosmic transformation so that we can form a 
trinity with Heaven and Earth.) 
100 MENCIUS, VIIA: 4 
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comprehensive concern.101  Everydayness is not only the point of departure but also the 
eventual return of the significant spiritual journey.102  The Confucian endorses the view 
that we can realize the ultimate meaning of life in ordinary human existence; what we 
normally do on a daily basis is the manifestation the highest excellence of itself. Thus, 
the transcending aspect in Confucian thought, always focuses on the lived world here and 
now.  “We must learn to transcend what we existentially are so that we can become what 
we ontologically are destined to be.”103  Because the Confucian “faith” in the intrinsic 
meaningfulness of humanity is a faith in the living person’s authentic possibility for self-
transcendence, the conception of self is divine in its all-embracing fullness.104  “To be 
religious, in the Confucian sense, is to be engaged in ultimate self-transformation as a 
communal act.  Salvation means the full realization of the anthropocosmic reality 
inherent in our human nature.” 105   Selfhood, in this sense, is both immanent and 
transcendent.106 
      The enlightening self, in Confucian thought, is not an isolated and enclosed 
individual.  On the contrary, self-cultivation is a precondition for harmonizing human 
                                                 
101 Mencius built his entire philosophy on the tenet that human nature is originally good.  Since man is 
originally good, it follows that he possessed the innate knowledge of the good.  If one develops his mind to 
the utmost, he can “serve heaven” and fulfill his destiny. See Mencius 7A:1. 
102 TU WEI-MING, HUMANITY AND SELF-CULTIVATION: ESSAYS IN CONFUCIAN THOUGHT 71-82 (Berkeley: 
Asian Humanities Press 1980) (arguing the real task in Neo-Confucians is to manifest the ultimate meaning 
of life in ordinary human existence.) 
103 TU WEI-MING, CONFUCIAN THOUGHT: SELFHOOD AS REATIVE TRANSFORMATION 63 (State University 
of New York Press, 1985). 
104 See general TU WEI-MING, CONFUCIAN THOUGHT, Chap. III (1985). 
105 Id, at 64.  
106 Id, at 125. 
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relatedness.107  “The experience that is considered truly personal is not at all private to 
the individual; self-knowledge is a form of inner experience precisely because it 
resonates with the inner experience of the other.” 108   Confucians maintain that one 
becomes fully human through continuous interaction with other human beings: A person 
who is not sensitive or responsive to the others around him is self-centered that leads him 
to a closed world.109  The true self, on the contrary, is an open system--a system of 
broadening the self to embody an ever-expanding circle of human relatedness.110   The 
Confucian dictum says: “in order to establish myself, I establish others; in order to 
enlarge myself, I enlarge others.”111  This description is not only an altruistic idea but 
also symbolizes the human possibility for enthicoreligious growth through communal 
acts.  
    Self-cultivation may mean different things to different people.  That is why Confucians 
encourage a multiple way to pursue self-perfectibility.  The Confucian Golden Rule is: 
“Do not do to others what you would not want others to do to you.”112  It shows the 
awareness that the best way for me is not necessarily the best for my neighbor.  This 
                                                 
107 Id. at 55.  
108 Taoist expresses this internality as “spiritual communion.” See TU WEI-MING, CONFUCIAN THOUGHT, at 
23 (1985). 
109 WING-TSIT CHAN, A SOURCE BOOK OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY, 530 (Princeton University Press 1969). 
110 Tu Wei-Ming suggested that Confucian self-cultivation is never the private possession of a single 
individual but a sharable experience that underlies common humanity. See general TU WEI-MING, 
CONFUCIAN THOUGHT, chap. III (1985). 
111 ANALECTS, VI:30. 
112 ANALECTS XV:24. 
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recognition is essential for the peaceful coexistence of different beliefs in a society.  In 
Mencius word:   
All the ten thousand things are there in me.  There is no greater joy for me than to 
find, on self-examination, that I am true to myself.  Try your best to treat others as 
you wish to be treated yourself, and you will find that this is the shortest way to 
humanity.113 
 
      The reluctance to impose one’s own way on others, however, must not prevent one 
from trying to experience with other human being as an integral part of one’s own quest 
for self–knowledge.114  Confucian selfhood is a dynamic process of spiritual development 
and an active participation in the living community—the family, the state and the world.  
When the personal life is cultivated, then the family life is regulated; when the family life 
is regulated, then the national life is orderly; and when the national life is orderly, then 
there is harmony in the world.115 
Analects XX:8 states:  
There are five universal ways [in human relations], and the way by which they are 
practiced is three.  The five are those governing the relationship between ruler and 
minister, between father and son, between husband and wife, between elder and 
younger brothers, and those in the intercourse between friends.  These five are 
universal paths in the world.  
 
      The five “universal ways” are more referred as the “five orders” or “five 
relationships” (Wu-lun). They represent basic human relations in the eyes of Confucian.  
      Filial piety in Confucian is considered to be prime virtue and the basis of its 
understanding (rules) of proper human relations.  The father-son relationship is the 
                                                 
113 MENCIUS, VIIA:4. 
114 Tu Wei-Ming, CONFUCIAN THOUGHT, at 26. 
115 F.S.C.NORTHROP, THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST 323 (New York, 1947). 
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central to Confucian symbolism.  It is often suggested that filial piety, as a form of 
hierarchically defined obedience, provides the theoretical foundation for an autocratic 
polity. 116   However, the principle governing the father-son relationship is actually 
reciprocity.  A filial son is not necessarily an obedient son.  The son is morally obligated 
to see that his father acts in accord with the norms of fatherhood.  If the father acts 
unfatherly, the son, for his own self-cultivation as well as for the well-being of his father, 
must assume the responsibility of improving the situation.117  Chung-Yung characterizes 
the filial son in terms of his ability to “continue” (Chi) the “will” (chih) and to “transmit” 
(shu) the “work” (shih) of his father.118    
      As far as “continuation” is concerned, it involves an appreciation not only of the 
father’s existential situation but also of his ideal self-image.119  The father’s ego-ideal, his 
wishes for himself as well as what he has created as standards for the family, is an 
integral part of the legacy that the son receives.120   
                                                 
116 The following statement, in ANALECTS, I:2, has often been cited to support this claim: “Few of those 
who are filial sons and respectful brothers will show disrespect to superiors, and there has never been a man 
who is not disrespectful to superiors and yet creates disorders. . . Filial piety and brotherly respect are the 
root of humanity (jen).”  See TU WEI-MING, CENTRALITY AND COMMONALITY, 41 (State University of New 
York Press 1989). 
117 An obedient son follows the instructions of his father, but he must try to understand the general direction 
of his father’s inner thoughts as well as his expressed wishes.  Therefore, the filial son is responsible both 
for what his father has actually said and for what he has left unsaid. See TU WEI-MING, CULTURE AND 
SELF, 231-251 (Anthony Marsella, George De Vos and Francis Hsu ed., London: Tavistock Press 1965); 
See also TU WEI-MING, CENTRALITY AND COMMONALITY 99-106 (State University of New York Press 
1989). 
118 ANALECTS: XIX:2 
119 Confucius himself stressed: “Nowadays a filial son is just a man who keeps his parents in food.  But 
even dogs or horses are given food.  If there is no feeling of reverence, wherein lies the difference?” See 
ANALECTS, II 7.  
120 TU WEI-MING, CONFUCIAN THOUGH—SELFHOOD AS CREATIVE TRANSFORMATION 119, (State University 
of New York Press 1985). 
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      The idea of continuity must not be taken literally to mean the continuity of a 
biological line.  The Confucian contends that a person cannot simply bypass his 
primordial ties in order to demonstrate a general love for mankind.121  A son who is 
incapable of caring for his father and his close relatives can hardly be expected to 
understand universal love.  So powerful is this idea that Chinese believe that any rites 
cannot hope to exhibit themselves in the wider relations of man to man in the community, 
if they are not first achieved in the more intimate and warmly affectionate, biologically 
and naturalistically grounded unit of the family.122  In this sense, most organizations in 
China tended to be family business organizations, and the mentality of the Western 
business corporations, involving partnership of independent individual and separations of 
powers, is alien to Chinese culture.                                             
      The injunction that the son “transmits the work of his father” suggested the son was a 
“transmitter” not a “maker”.123   Transmission involves a commitment to the continuous 
well-being of a chosen heritage.124  To undertake such a commitment, one must have a 
sophisticated appreciation of the strength and limitation of that which is to be 
inherited.125  Because of this Confucian choice, “transmission is more profound and more 
difficult than making, the person who transmits is not merely to adapt himself to his 
immediate environment but to see to it that the new world he attempts to shape is faithful 
                                                 
121 MENCIUS, IIIB:9. This is part of the reason why Mencius criticizes Mo Tzu’s concept of “universal 
love.”  Mencius insisted that the practice of love must start with the family and he opposed the universal 
love without distinctions. See also D.C. LAU, MENCIUS, 114 (Hong Kong, Chinese University Press 1970). 
122 F.S.C. NORTHROP, at 327. 
123 ANALECTS, VII:1. 
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to the intentions of his forefathers.”126  Analects, 7,1 states: “…reflection of the light of 
the men of old is a development of that light. They transmitted indeed, but their 
transmission was creation.” 127 
    By the same token, the maintenance of an ancestral line is not merely the biological 
prolongation of the life of family.  Rather, it signifies the continuation of a personality 
ideal exemplified by the forefathers of the ancestral line and the transmission of cultural 
values created by its outstanding members.128  It is precisely for this reason that the 
worship of ancestors is so important.  By putting up tablets which preserve the memory 
of the forefather’s full, rich and unique personalities and by carrying on ceremonies 
associated with one’s sense of indebtedness to them, a continuity of their full personality 
beyond the time of death be preserved.129   
      A clan is a descent group, organized mainly for ancestral worships.  Such a group is 
patrilineageal, that is, its traces its origin to common male ancestor.  For ancestral 
worship, Chung-yung describes the ceremonial acts of filial descendants as follows: 
In spring and autumn they repaired their ancestral temple, displayed their 
ancestral vessels and exhibited the ancestral robes, and presented the appropriate 
offerings of the season.  The ritual of the ancestral temple is in order to place the 
kindred on the left or on the right according to the order of descent.  This order in 
rank is meant to distinguish the more honorable or humbler stations.  Services in 
the temple are arranged in order so as to give distinction to the worthy.  In the 
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pledging rite the inferiors present their cups to their superiors, so that people of 
humble stations may have something to do.  In the concluding feast, honored 
places were given people with white hair, so as to follow the order of seniority.  
To occupy places of their forefathers, to practice their rites, to perform their 
music, to reverence those whom they honored, to love those who were dear to 
them, to serve the dead as they were served while alive, and to serve the departed 
as they were served while still with us: this is the height of filial piety.130 
 
      An ancestral worship by filial descendents may be taken as the microcosm of an ideal 
society.  Ceremonial acts in this worship symbolize desirable behavioral patterns. “To 
respect the old and to honor the dead is to show special concern for the common origin of 
all.  The old are respected not only for their past service but also for the continual value 
of their wise guidance.  The dead are honored because a loving memory of the forefathers 
brings forth communal identity and social solidarity.”131 
      An ancestral worship, however, cannot be artificially constructed; it must be 
formulated in according with the spiritual orientation of the rites in society.  Confucius 
said, “Tz’u, you love the lamb, but I love the rite.”132  The ceremony may be awkwardly 
performed for lack of serious purpose, commitment and skills.  A beautiful and effective 
ceremony requires the personal presence to be fused with learned ceremonial skill-- this 
ideal fusion is true li as sacred rite.133   
      Li is rendered as “ceremony,” “rite,” “ritual,” “propriety,” in Confucian scriptance. 
Social etiquette in general, the father-son, the brother-brother, the prince-subject, the 
friend-friend and the husband –wife relations — persons and their five relations are to be 
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seen as ultimately sanctified by virtue of their place in li.134  The act of li entails the 
participation in with the others.  The human relationships are symbolic kind, defined by 
tradition and convention, rooted in respect and appreciation. Each gesture, such as 
serving and eating, requires numerous practices before it takes the proper form.  Li brings 
out forcefully not only the harmony and beauty of social forms but also the inherent and 
ultimate dignity of human intercourse.135   
      Li to Confucian still retains a very strong sacrificial component as we saw in our 
discussion of ancestral worship.  “The meaning of li evolved from a proper act of offering 
sacrifice to an authentic way of establishing human-relatedness, which in the Mencian 
version actually involves the act of self-transformation.”136  To act in ceremony in li is to 
be completely open to the other, for ceremony is public, shared and transparent.137  In 
Chung-yung: “The ceremonies of sacrifices to Heaven and Earth are meant for the service 
of the Lord on High, and the ceremonies performed in the ancestral temple are meant for 
the service of ancestors.” 138   If we read Chung-yung carefully, we notice that the 
establishment and implementation of ceremonies depend not only on sagely efforts but 
also on the participation of the entire populace.139  It is in this delightful shared and open 
participation with others and connection with forefathers who are ultimately like oneself 
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that man realizes himself. 140  The rite is a proven ceremonial which all participants 
emerge with a sense of awe and purification.141  The Confucian rite, li, becomes an ever-
deepening and broadening awareness of the presence of the others in one’s self-
cultivation and the real way to appreciate the universal mandate of Heaven inherent in 
our human nature.  “The idea of rite, which implies a dynamic process of self-cultivation 
in the spirit of filiality, brotherhood, friendship, discipleship and loyalty, seems to capture 
well this basic Confucian intention.”142 
V. Two origins  
      The poet-philosopher has been a striking characteristic of Chinese philosophical 
tradition.  Since poetry is a free combination of similes and suggestions, it can express an 
infinite range of meanings with a few words; what the poet communicates is not “what he 
says, but what he does not.”143  Because of its “poetic modality”, the language barrier for 
translation becomes even more formidable.144  The gap between the two radically 
different epistemic areas between West and China, may remain forever wide and open. 
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Legal anthropologists have long struggled against overwhelming odds in order to reach 
an understanding, even though it still turned out to be partial and imperfect.145   
      Confucian self-transformation suggests that although we are not what we ought to be, 
we can reach the highest state of humanity through personal cultivation.  The process of 
learning to be fully human entails not only communal participation but also a “faithful 
dialogical response to the transcendent.”146  This opening up is a fulfillment of humanity 
as well as an answer to the Mandate of Heaven.147   
      However, this transcendence of Heaven is significantly different from the western 
concept of the transcendence of God.  Confucian cosmological insight is a full realization 
of our minds can lead us to a comprehension of our nature and eventually to an 
understanding of Heaven.  It is based on the belief that our selfhood is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for us to appreciate in total the subtle meaning of the Mandate of 
Heaven.148  To translate into Christian terms, it means that humanity itself, without God’s 
grace, can fully realize its divinity.149  The act of creation as a conscious design by a 
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supernatural being is absolutely incompatible with Confucian selfhood.  In this sense, a 
gap between Creator and creature seems to be almost inconceivable.150 
      In light of this ideological context, it becomes unthinkable that Chinese clans or 
ancestral  trusts could be understood as commercial corporations driven by economic 
motivation, organized in “nexus of contracts,” in pursuit of profits.  Chung-yung defines 
filial piety in terms of transmission and continuity.151  The recognition that we come into 
existence not by accident but as part of a long and continuous line of transmission gives 
us a sense of rootedness,152  which reminds us that we are responsible not only for those 
who brought about our existence(our ancestors) but also for those who are yet to come, 
who will transmit our hopes.153  Confucians see that being filial to one’s ancestors is 
being reverent toward to Heaven; that “to nourish their will” in the ancestral worship 
ceremony is the sacred rite.  In Tu Wei-Ming words, “they are . . . ecological principles 
humanly designed but heavenly inspired for the primary purpose of bringing peace and 
harmony to the universe.”154 
      As we discussed above, one cannot fully appreciate the overall Chinese cultural 
context without developing a sense of the Chinese legal sensibility in the larger social 
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order.  Imposing Western legal concepts upon Chinese legal tradition, risks asking the 
wrong questions or answering irrelevantly.  At worst, it may lead to misinterpret the 
Chinese legal order.  Geertz claims: “…to rely on Western polarization is now not just to 
distort the law elsewhere, it is to be left without anything, save mockery and lamentation, 
to say about it at all.”155  Each tradition has its own value and its own limits.  How could 
the western legal tradition, in its search for faith and reason, reach the same essential 
questions as Chinese tradition in its search for wisdom and harmony?  “Prose in the west, 
poetry in China,”156 neither can supplant the other; both are necessary: not because their 
contents would be complementary, but because their modes of expression make them 
unexchangeable . . . we can never know which one is a commentator of the other.157 
      “The only reliable human universal may be human difference.”158  To compare such 
different traditions asks us to bring together incommensurable ideologies and dissimilar 
experience.  The diversity of legal traditions and the diversity of ways of life in different 
cultures embody the human capacity for choice and self-creation.  “Where difference is 
lacking, violence threaten.”159  As in ecosystem, biodiversity is the key to the 
sustainability.160  Culture has to conform to this important principle of evolutionary 
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biology: most change occurs to maintain the organism in its steady state.161  Hence, 
Culture is a plural tantum: it exists only in the plural.162  Law is a culture fabric. The 
comparative study of law is then seen as an exercise in intercultural transaction which 
requires historical dynamics and internal variation.  The vitality of comparative law 
demands not the abolition of difference but the management of cultural heteronomies and 
the acceptance of the coexistence of non-harmonised particularities.  To allow something 
to be seen for what it is; to allow a law to affirm itself in its difference is the only way to 
do justice to the profound diversity of legal experience across jurisdictions.  But what is 
the true difference?  As long as foreign legal cultures only look like or unlike us, and as 
long as they are treated as same or other, they do not speak for themselves.  In doing that, 
we take ourselves as the yardstick or as the norm.  Instead, we have to learn to accept that 
others have different truths.  “We are faced with defining ourselves neither by distancing 
others nor by drawing them close to us as our facsimiles but by locating ourselves among 
them.” 163  This will require us to be open to all differences beneath the surface, and even 
in spite of surface similarities, as well as the possibility of differences at the most 
fundamental level.164  “The search for non-difference is the strongest censorship”.165   
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      Moreover, comparisons involve a greater sensitivity to the relationship between the 
self and the other. The argument of self-understanding and other understanding are 
internally connected.  Difference conditions identity.166  Studying the relationship 
between the “West” and China is also a point of entry into studying the formation and 
meaning of Western or Chinese cultural practices themselves.  In effect, identity requires 
difference in order to assume its being.  One example, the first cannot be the first if there 
is not the second after it.  Thus, the second is not just what comes after the first, but it is 
what allows the first to be the first.  It is through the second that the first is first.167  
“Identity, because it is a relation, demands, as the condition of its very existence, the 
existence of a non-identity.  Only the existence of non-identity allows identity to exist as 
identity, which is to say the identity owes its existence to non-identity.”168  In that sense, 
I is the other.169  Rather than seeing the others as not so much like us, we should see 
ourselves as very similar to others while acknowledging, accepting, embracing, and even 
admiring our differences.170 
      Still the question remains: whether focus on difference could connote isolationism.  
Difference needs not be viewed as divisive and impoverishing.  It also can be 
experienced as an affirmation of being.171  Comparative law as an exercise in cross-
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cultural translation does not focus on difference for the sake of difference.   Clifford 
Geertz draws a distinction between difference and dichotomy: “a difference is a 
comparison and it relates; a dichotomy is a severance and it isolates.”172  Hence, Philp 
Larkin’s remark: “Insisting so on difference, made me welcome:/ Once that was 
recognized, we were in touch.”173  To fully recognize other’s differences and uniqueness, 
will enhance the understandings and foster the tolerance.  Comparative research, 
therefore, must develop an acute sensitivity to the peculiarities of the local, pushing 
against cultural barriers toward an ideal of mutual comprehension and building bridges 
among people.  In contrast, a false conclusion of similarity avoids the complexity of truth 
and reduces the otherness by assimilating it to sameness.  It purses the sense of 
universality at the price of vibrate culture diversity.  Spanish poet Antonio Machado 
stated: “…But the other refuses to disappear: it subsists, it persists; it is the hard bone on 
which reason breaks its teeth.  There is what might be called the incurable otherness from 
which oneness must always suffer.”174 
      With repeated warning about the impossibility of understanding the others, should we 
give up communicating?  Of course not.  An awareness of “irreducible 
incomparables”,175 does not mean to give up communications. It means that comparison 
demand “thick description”176, --rich, mutilayered and detailed accounts of social 
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experience to convey the complexity of cultural differences.  Vivian Curran refers to this 
method as “immersion comparison”.  It involves studying, not just legal rules, but also 
social values, beliefs, traditions and collective identities and emotions.177 We also need to 
adjust to expecting the unexpected; cherish the irreducible difference with a striving to 
reach comprehension and a recognition that some distance will remain.   
      People occasionally do exchange their thoughts or share their difference.  “Exciting 
and fruitful disagreement” is a heightening cultural and legal self-consciousness.178  The 
world is a various place, various between China and America, various between 
Confucianism and Christianity, various between colonial thens and nationalist nows, 
various between little tradition and great, “much is to be gained . . . by confronting that 
grand actuality rather than wishing it away in a haze of forceless generalities and false 
comforts.”179  Let us enjoy the stereophonic quality of the variations between one 
tradition and the other.  In Menius world: “Try your best to treat others as you wish to be 
treated yourself, and you will find that this is the shortest way to humanity.”180 
 
VI. Conclusion 
      Teemu Ruskola’s Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship told us that many 
traditional Chinese clans were commercial enterprises organized in the idiom of the 
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family.  These “clan corporations” operated many functions that western corporate does 
today.  Ruskola claimed even before the introduction of Western corporate law, China 
had already had indigenous tradition in corporate governance.  In the attempt to challenge 
Orientalist myths of China, his article reads the properties of western corporation into 
Chinese clan which it never possessed.   When Chinese or other traditions are “made 
familiar and are adjudicated on the basis of Western standard…they can only be an 
inferior variation on a Western theme.”181  This mistaken conclusion of similarity ignored 
the overall cultural context of China in which evolve its distinctive legal habits, history, 
social relationships and ideologies.  It assumed that Chinese clans occurred in a cultural 
vacuum.  Thus, its output remained largely irrelevant to Chinese legal sensitivity.  The 
erroneous analogy is just as great an obstacle to the adequate understanding of Chinese 
culture as is prejudice of one’s own superiority.  Since any difference suggests a 
dimension unknown to the self, it becomes extremely challenging for comparatists to 
understand other legal culture according to that culture’s own perspective.182  If the 
comparative study is to produce anything of value, it should develop the awareness to the 
complex ramification of each culture.  After all, the effort to understand others heightens 
one’s awareness of his own heritage even as he seeks to explain another.    
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